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Abstract – The evolution of fairness in dyadic relationships has been studied using ultimatum
games. However, human fairness is not limited to two-person situations and universal egalitari-
anism among group members is widely observed. In this study, we investigated the evolution of
favoritism and group fairness in a three-person ultimatum game (TUG) under a co-evolutionary
framework with both strategy updating and partner switching dynamics. In the TUG, one pro-
poser makes an offer to two responders and the proposal is accepted at the group level if at least
one individual responder accepts the offer. Investigating fairness beyond dyadic relationships al-
lows the possibility of favoritism because the proposer can secure acceptance at the group level
by discriminating in favor of one responder. Our simulation showed that the proposer favors one
responder with a similar type when the frequency of partner switching is low. In contrast, group
fairness is observed when the frequency of partner switching is high. The correlation between
strategy and neighborhood size suggested that partner switching influences the strategy through
the proposer’s offer rather than through the responder’s acceptance threshold. In addition, the
average degree negatively impacts the emergence of fairness unless the frequency of partner switch-
ing is high. Furthermore, a higher frequency of partner switching can support the evolution of
fairness when the maximum number of games in one time step is restricted to smaller values.
Introduction. – The evolution of cooperation is one
of the most actively investigated subjects in the physical
and biological sciences [1,2]. It is known that fair division
of the benefit of collaborative behavior is important for
maintaining cooperative relationships [3]. Thus, the fair-
ness of resource division has been studied using ultimatum
games [4]. In ultimatum games, two players (a proposer
and a responder) divide the resource. The proposer makes
an offer regarding the resource division. If the responder
accepts the offer, the resource is divided accordingly. If
the responder rejects the offer, both players gain nothing.
The standard equilibrium notion in classical game the-
ory predicts that the proposer almost monopolizes the re-
source. The responder gains nothing by rejection, so they
should accept any positive offer. Expecting this reaction, a
rational proposer should claim most of the resource. How-
ever, experimental evidence has repeatedly falsified this
prediction [5]. An excessively low offer is often rejected,
and the proposer offers nearly half of the resource to the
responder. These observations are explained better by a
model that incorporates the disutility due to inequity [6].
Many theoretical models have been proposed to explain
the evolutionary origin of fairness. One approach stresses
that the opportunity to choose the interaction partner is
crucial for the evolution of fairness [7]. Other studies have
shown that error [8] and weak selection [9] can also ex-
plain the preference for fairness in ultimatum games. The
roles of reputation [10] and empathy [11] have also been
investigated.
Among the mechanisms proposed for the evolution of
fairness, the effect of the network (spatial) structure is
among the most intensively studied. A seminal study has
shown that introducing lattice structure can facilitate the
emergence of fairness [12]. This positive effect of the net-
work structure was also confirmed using more complex
network structures [13]. The role of the network structure
has also been studied in combination with other mecha-
nisms, including empathy [14,15], the fineness of the strat-
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egy [16], role switching [17], allocation mechanism of di-
vided resource [18,19], migration [20] and simple strategy
updating after the breakdown of bargaining [21].
In addition, recent research considers the possibility
that both the interaction structure and the strategy em-
ployed by players could co-evolve. In these studies, play-
ers can change interaction partners based on the neigh-
bors’ strategy or the payoff from the game. The results
obtained in previous studies have shown that fairness can
evolve more easily if opportunities exist for partner switch-
ing (choice) [22–25]. The role of partner switching (choice)
has also been investigated with respect to the evolution of
cooperation. Previous studies have shown that partner
switching (choice) enhances cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma [26–37] and public goods game [38–40].
These previous studies on the ultimatum game have
deepened our understanding of fairness in dyadic relation-
ships. However, human fairness is not limited to two-
person situations. Indeed, Boehm [41] noted that uni-
versal egalitarianism among group members is widely ob-
served in hunter gatherers and tribal agriculturalists. De-
spite this empirical observation, there have been few the-
oretical analyses of group fairness. In contrast, the evo-
lution of cooperation in public goods games on networks
has been widely investigated [42–53].
In this study, we investigated the evolution of group fair-
ness in the three-person ultimatum game (TUG) based on
numerical simulations. In the TUG, one proposer makes
a proposal regarding resource division to two responders.
The proposal is accepted, and resource division occurs if
at least one responder accepts the offer. In the TUG, the
proposer can secure the support of one responder while ex-
cluding the rest. As a result, the possibility of favoritism
is introduced. The possibility of favoritism questions the
effectiveness of the mechanism that is assumed to sup-
port the evolution of group fairness. For example, Boehm
[41] suggested that punishment via the coalition of weaker
individuals can support the emergence of group fairness.
However, a favored agent has little incentive to conduct
punishment, so a coalition may be unstable.
Some important previous studies [54, 55] investigated
the multiplayer ultimatum game in a well-mixed popula-
tion. In the multiplayer ultimatum game, one proposer
offers part of the resource to multiple responders and
each responder accepts or rejects the offer. These stud-
ies have shown that the minimum number of individual
acceptances needed for group level acceptance is impor-
tant. Here, the proposer has to offer the same amount of
the resource to all responders, and the possibility of fa-
voritism is not considered. In fact, one study [55] noted
that the effect of allowing the proposer to target offers to
specific responders is an open question.
In this study, we introduced a co-evolutionary mecha-
nism where the strategies used in the game and individ-
ual partnerships can both evolve. Our simulations showed
that the ratio of the frequency of partner switching events
relative to strategy updating events has a profound effect
on the distribution of the resource in the group.
Model. – First, we explained the TUG. In the TUG,
there is one proposer and two responders. The proposer
offers pA and pB to the two responders. Who will be of-
fered pA (pB) is determined by the agents’ type, θ (range:
0-1). The distance between two agents i and j is defined
as rij = min(|θi − θj |, 1 − |θi − θj |). Note that this defi-
nition means that the type is a circular variable where 0
and 1 are equivalent. This circular nature ensures that no
agent is in advantageous position because of its type. The
proposer offers pA (pB) to the responder if their distance
from the proposer is small (large). If pA > pB(pA < pB),
then the proposer favors (disfavors) the responder with
a similar type. Without θ, even if pA 6= pB, agents de-
cide who will be favored randomly in each game and their
behavior cannot be interpreted as favoritism in the long
term. Each responder compares their minimum demand
q and pA (pB) and accepts or rejects the offer. We intro-
duced the group decision variable (g), which takes a value
of 1 if the proposal is accepted at the group level and 0
otherwise.
The group makes a decision based on the proposal to
offer piA (piB) to j (k) in the following manner.
gijk =
{
1, if piA ≥ qj ∨ piB ≥ qk
0, otherwise
Thus, the proposal is accepted if at least one responder
accepts the offer. Using gijk, the payoff from the game for
the proposer i is calculated as πi = gijk[1 − (piA + piB)].
The payoff for the responders j and k are calculated as
πj = gijkpiA and πk = gijkpiB, respectively. Classical
game theory predicts that the proposer will monopolize
the resource in the same manner as in the two-person ul-
timatum game [55]. Furthermore, the proposer obviously
has a strong incentive to ignore one responder because
their approval is not needed for group level acceptance.
Next, we explained the evolutionary process for the net-
work structure and the strategy in the TUG. Let us as-
sume that N agents are located in the network, which is
defined by the neighbors of each agent. The edges between
agents represent social relationships. Initially, all agents
have the same number of edges (〈k〉), which are randomly
connected to other agents [56]. The size of the proposal
has random values under the restriction that the sum of
the proposals, pA+pB, does not exceed 1. The responder’s
minimum acceptance threshold also has a random value.
The type (θ) also follows a standard uniform distribution,
U(0, 1). In each time step, a strategy updating event or a
partner switching event occurs.
Strategy updating occurs with a probability of 1−w. We
used a link-based update rule to reduce the effects of large
degree nodes in the neighborhood [32]. This rule is simi-
lar to the “pairwise comparison process” in the well-mixed
population model [57]. In a strategy updating event, we
first chose one edge (Eij) randomly. Next, agent i (j)
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plays TUG with their direct neighbors ki (kj) times, where
ki (kj) is node i’s (j’s) number of neighbors. The number
of games corresponds to the ordinary evolutionary game
on the graph, where agents engage in two-person games
with all their neighbors. In each game, two agents who
play TUG with i (j) are chosen randomly from the neigh-
bors and the proposer is also chosen randomly from the
three agents. Agents i and j gain a payoff from each game
and accumulate total payoffs of Πi and Πj , respectively.
Next, Πi and Πj are compared and strategy updating oc-
curs. Specifically, the strategy of agent j replaces that of
agent i with a probability of
P (si ← sj) = [1 + exp(−β(Πj −Πi))]
−1.
The value of β is the intensity of selection (β → 0 leads
to random drift whereas β → ∞ leads to imitation dy-
namics); otherwise, the strategy of agent i replaces that of
agent j. As a result, one of the two agents copies the other
agent’s strategy. In addition, the agent’s type is copied at
the same time. This corresponds to the assumption in pre-
vious studies regarding the evolution of favoritism where
the strategies of agents as well as group membership evolve
according to the payoff [58].
We assume that a small error accompanies the copying
of attributes, where the error follows a uniform distribu-
tion, U(−ǫ, ǫ). Note that if the strategic variable (pA, pB
or q) takes value outside the defined condition (range: 0-
1), then we set the value to the nearest boundary value.
In addition, if the sum of pA and pB exceeds 1, then we
compressed it to one while keeping the ratio between pA
and pB. We also set the value of the type (θ) to θ−1(θ+1)
if it exceeds 1 (goes below 0) due to its circular nature.
A partner switching event is chosen with a probability
of w. In a partner switching event, one agent (i) is chosen
randomly and plays TUG with their direct neighbors ki
times in the same manner as the strategy updating event.
The agent decides the continuation of the social relation-
ship based on the payoff from the games. Specifically, the
agent finds one game where they gained the smallest pay-
off and breaks the relationship with the two neighbors who
participated in that game [22,40]. If the agent earned the
same smallest payoff in multiple games, one game is cho-
sen randomly. Next, agent i creates new links with two
randomly chosen agents. We imposed the restriction that
an agent with two edges does not lose links so that they
can participate in TUG if they are a focal agent.
Intuitively, partner switching appears to engender a
generous offer because responders will not be satisfied with
a small offer and they will sever the link. In contrast,
link adaptation appears to foster a “rational” acceptance
threshold because rejection may cause the negotiation to
break down (with the smallest payoff, 0). These opposite
possible effects complicate the prediction.
Results. – To investigate the emerging resource dis-
tribution in the TUG, we conducted numerical simula-
tions. The simulations continued for 2 × 107 time steps,
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Fig. 1: Average offer (pA, pB) and acceptance threshold (q) as
a function of w. The proposer favored one responder when w
was small. As w increased, the proposer stopped discriminating
and the offer size increased sharply when w exceeded some
specific value. The acceptance threshold also increased steeply
together with the offer size. Parameters: (a) β = 0.01, (b)
β = 0.1, (c) β = 1; fixed N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 20, and ǫ = 0.01.
and we computed the quantities of interest by averaging
over the values from the last 104 time steps. We con-
ducted 50 independent simulations for each combination
of parameters and calculated the mean values from these
simulation runs.
First, we observed the impact of the frequency of part-
ner switching on the TUG results. The parameter w con-
trols the frequency of partner switching, and a larger value
implies that agents have more opportunities to adjust their
social relationships. Figure 1 shows the mean values of pA,
pB, and q as a function of w for different values of β. The
figure shows that pA was larger than pB with a smaller
value of w, which means that proposers consistently dis-
criminated in favor of one responder with a similar type.
Proposers treated one responder indifferently because this
responder was strategically irrelevant for securing support
at the group level, and the type functioned as a tag when
deciding the favored agent. The sum of the offer for two
agents was larger when selection was weak (small β), and
this result is similar to that obtained in previous studies
[9,54]. However, the condition that induces fairness in the
two-person ultimatum game led to favoritism rather than
group fairness.
Figure 1 also shows that as the value of w increased, the
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value of pA started to decrease, whereas that of pB started
to increase. Proposers stopped discriminating responders
to prevent the relationship being severed by the indiffer-
ently treated responder. This increase in the offer raised
the probability of pB being accepted, which deteriorated
the importance of the favored agent in securing the group
level acceptance. Taking the result of β = 0.1 as an exam-
ple, when w = 0.05, the number of cases where only pA was
accepted was 13.7 times larger than the cases where only
pB was accepted. Conversely, this ratio was only 1.8 when
w = 0.4 and the importance of favored agents actually
diminished. As a result, proposers could lower the degree
of favoritism while keeping their own share (pA + pB).
In addition, the values of pA and pB both started to
increase as w increased further. In this situation, the pro-
posers stopped monopolizing the resource and group fair-
ness was achieved. We noted that with a very large value
for w, the resource distribution was slightly unfavorable to
the proposer, especially when selection was weak. This re-
sult is obtained when a deterministic rule is used for part-
ner switching [24] although the disadvantage was much
weaker in our results.
The acceptance threshold of the responder decreased
when w was small, thereby supporting the intuitive predic-
tion. Intuitively, larger opportunities for partner switching
(higher w) were disadvantageous to agents with a larger
q because rejecting the offer could lead to a 0 payoff and
losing links with other players. However, the value of q
increased rapidly as w increased. Furthermore, pA (pB)
and q started to increase with almost the same value of
w. This result suggested that the proposer’s strategy is
strongly related to the character of the network.
Note that if the acceptance by both responders was re-
quired, the favoritism was not observed because there was
no reason to distinguish two responders. Group fairness
was similarly observed when w was large enough. Our
point is that co-evolutionary mechanism can lead to group
fairness even if the game involves one strategically irrele-
vant player (see supplementary fig.S1 for this result).
We also checked the results by investigating the strategy
that emerged as a function of β. Figure 2 shows that with-
out the opportunity for partner switching (w = 0), all the
strategic variables decreased as the intensity of selection
became stronger. In fact, the offer to a similar agent (pA)
exceeded 0.3 when the intensity of selection was extremely
weak, and this value was almost the same as the result in
fig. 1 when the frequency of link adaptation was high.
However, the value of pB (shown in panel (b)) was consis-
tently smaller than the value of pA (panel (a)). Thus, a
tendency toward favoritism was observed regardless of the
value of β. The equality of the offer to the two agents was
observed only after the combination of w and β was suffi-
ciently large. Partner switching is beneficial to fair agents,
so they can fully exploit this advantage under strong se-
lection. We also observed that the value of q exhibited a
similar pattern to pA and pB, which was similar to that
shown in fig. 1.
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Fig. 2: Average offer (pA, pB) and acceptance threshold q as
a function of β for different values of w. All the strategic vari-
ables were decreasing functions of β without partner switching.
A smaller value of β was sufficient for the evolution of fairness
if the frequency of partner switching was high. The respon-
der’s behavior (q) exhibited the same pattern with pA and pB.
Parameters: N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 20, and ǫ = 0.01.
The effect of a higher frequency of partner switching
can be understood in the following way. Agents who of-
fer a small resource will lose edges and gain a smaller
payoff. This fact encourages agents to make a generous
offer (higher pA (pB)). In addition, the smallest payoff
determines the severance of relationships, so discriminat-
ing two responders is disadvantageous for the maintenance
of edges. We noted that the offer size does not increase
without limit. If the average of the sum of pA and pB
is above 2/3, the worst payoff will probably be achieved
when the focal agent is a proposer. Thus, the opportunity
to sever relationships by unsatisfied responders will be re-
duced and a generous offer will not help agents to acquire
more edges. In this situation, the acceptance threshold
(q) is almost neutral unless it exceeds the offer size. An
acceptance threshold above the offer size will simply lead
to the rejection of a generous offer and the loss of social
relationships. In fact, the value of q fluctuated over time
below pA (pB) after the offer size became larger, which
suggests that the acceptance threshold was not related to
the resulting network when w was large.
To examine the relationship between the game strategy
and the resulting network, fig. 3 shows the Pearson’s cor-
relation coefficients between the strategy variables and the
p-4
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Fig. 3: Correlations between the strategic variables (pA, pB,
q) and neighborhood size (k) as a function of w. The correla-
tion between pA (pB) and k was positive and increased mono-
tonically. By contrast, the correlation between q and k was
negative with a smaller w but approached zero with a larger
w. Parameters: (a) β = 0.01, (b) β = 0.1, (c) β = 1; fixed
N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 20, and ǫ = 0.01.
agent’s neighborhood size (k) as a function of w for differ-
ent values of β. We computed the correlation in the last
time period. The figure shows that the correlation between
pA (pB) and k was positive and that it increased weakly as
w increased. This result suggests that the co-evolutionary
mechanism penalizes greedy proposers by depriving them
of opportunities for interaction. In addition, the correla-
tion between pB and k was stronger than the correlation
between pA and k when w was small, which suggests that
an offer to a disfavored agent was more important before
a jump in the value of pA (pB) was observed.
The figure also shows that the monotonic relationship
did not hold with respect to q. With smaller values of
w, the correlation between q and k was negative and it
became stronger as the frequency of partner switching op-
portunities increased. The proposer kept their own share
with modest values of w, and the higher demand threshold
increased the possibility of bargaining breaking down (0
payoff) as well as risking the relationships with other play-
ers. However, with a larger value of w, the value of the cor-
relation coefficient started to increase and it approached 0.
Therefore, the relationship between the value of q and the
disadvantage due to the co-evolutionary mechanism disap-
peared. This pattern supports an interpretation where the
(a) pA
(b) pB
(c) q
10 15 20 25 30
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Average degree (<k>)
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
m
ea
n
w = 0.1
w = 0.2
w = 0.3
w = 0.4
w = 0.5
w = 0.6
Fig. 4: Strategic variables as a function of 〈k〉 : (a) pA, (b) pB
and (c) q. We show the results obtained for different values
of w. Basically, fairer behavior was observed as the average
degree decreased. However, a small average degree prevented
a fair strategy in some cases when the frequency of partner
switching was high. Parameters: N = 1000, β = 0.1, and
ǫ = 0.01.
co-evolutionary mechanism influences the behavior in the
ultimatum game mainly through the proposer’s strategy.
Next, we examined the effect of the average degree on
the emerging behavior. Figure 4 shows the results of TUG
as the function of 〈k〉 for different values of w. Basically,
the results obtained in previous studies [12,13,22,23] were
replicated and a smaller average degree led to fairness
(higher pA, pB and q; but see [20]). Because the num-
ber of successful bargaining rather than the gain from one
game had a stronger effect on the responders ’ payoff with
larger 〈k〉 , responders had a stronger temptation to lower
q as the neighborhood size increased and the proposal also
decreased accordingly [18, 20]. This logic also seemed to
apply in our TUG. An exception to this pattern occurred
when the value of w became large and the variables ap-
proached the values observed in the fair state. For exam-
ple, when w = 0.6, pA (pB, q) exhibited a different pattern
and a smaller 〈k〉 hindered the fair strategy in some cases.
Generous proposers enjoyed the benefit of larger degree
when w was high (fig.3). Because larger variance of de-
gree was observed with larger 〈k〉 (fig. 5, this result seems
to be independent of the resulting strategy since the same
pattern was observed when w ≤ 0.5), smaller 〈k〉 lowered
the benefit of degree heterogeneity for generous proposers.
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Fig. 5: Density of degree in the last period when 〈k〉 = 10
and 〈k〉 = 18. Larger average degree led to larger variance,
which was beneficial for generous proposers when the value of
w (and the correlation between offer size and degree) was high.
Parameters: N = 1000, w = 0.6, β = 0.1, and ǫ = 0.01.
Finally, we examined the impact of limiting the max-
imum number of games. The evolution of the network
structure generated a heterogeneous neighborhood size
(opportunities for social interactions) among agents. It is
natural to assume that some agents engaged in more social
interactions, but agents might not have been able to fully
exploit the benefits of the larger neighborhood size. One
method for dealing with this possibility is restricting the
maximum number of interactions per unit time [59]. Thus,
we restricted the number of games in terms of both strat-
egy updating and partner switching. Figure 6 shows the
results of TUG as a function of the maximum number of
interactions (kmax) for different values of w. As expected,
limiting the number of social interactions had a disadvan-
tageous effect on the emergence of group fairness. Less
egalitarian results emerged using the combination of pa-
rameters where group fairness evolved in fig. 1. However,
with a higher frequency of partner switching (w = 0.8),
agents did not have to fully exploit the full capacity of po-
tential interactions and the number of games needed for
fairness to emerge was less than the mean degree (in the
figure, 〈k〉 = 20).
Discussion. – In this study, we investigated the co-
evolutionary TUG. In the TUG, there is a possibility
that a proposer might discriminate in favor of a spe-
cific responder. Few studies have examined group fair-
ness despite its empirical significance. The impact of a
co-evolutionary mechanism is ambiguous because it ap-
pears to foster fair proposals and a rational response at
the same time, but our results showed that the opportu-
nities for partner switching led to the emergence of group
fairness. With a small opportunity for partner switching,
the proposer favored one responder. By increasing the fre-
quency of link adaptation, we then observed that equal-
ity among responders was achieved while proposers main-
tained their own large share. With a higher frequency of
partner switching, group fairness was observed. This state
emerged because the co-evolutionary mechanism worked
mainly through the proposer’s behavior. In fact, generous
proposers achieved a larger neighborhood size and the re-
sponder’s strategy had no impact on the resulting network.
We also observed that a smaller average degree enhanced
fair behavior although the opposite pattern was observed
(a) pA
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(c) q
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Fig. 6: Strategic variables as a function of the maximum num-
ber of interactions (kmax): (a) pA, (b) pB and (c) q. We show
the results obtained for different values of w. A smaller maxi-
mum number of interactions prevented the emergence of group
fairness. A higher frequency of partner switching reduced the
number of games required to achieve group fairness. Parame-
ters: N = 1000, 〈k〉 = 20, β = 1.0, and ǫ = 0.01.
in some cases when the frequency of partner switching
was high. Finally, a higher frequency of partner switching
could support the evolution of fairness when the maximum
number of games was restricted.
Our results have similarities with some observational
studies. For example, anthropologists have reported that
the social relationships of individuals who violated the
norm were severed [60]. Our simulation results suggest
that severing relationships functions as punishment [61]
and can actually support group fairness.
Our study helps understand the emergence of fairness
beyond dyadic relationships, but future extensions would
be beneficial. First, to simplify the problem, we investi-
gated the TUG with one proposer. Obviously, we could
consider more complex games. For example, an N -person
ultimatum game with one proposer [54] would increase
the complexity of the proposer’s strategy. In addition,
we could also consider a game with more than one pro-
poser, which was investigated in an experimental study
[62]. Furthermore, evolutionary or imitation dynamics
were assumed in the present study, but the robustness of
the results should be examined using another learning rule
[55]. We consider that this line of research would further
deepen our understanding of the evolution of fairness.
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